Monday, February 27, 2006
Finally a Strong, Independent Russia?
February 22, 2006 Russia Profile by Vladimir Ryzhkov
Or At Least That’s How It Looks From the Outside
It’s clear that Vladimir Putin’s presidency has strengthened Russia’s independence in the international sphere. Gross domestic product has grown by 40 percent, meaning that the country has become stronger. External debt has been reduced from $190 billion to $100 billion, and talk is that the Paris Club debt will be paid off in full this year. Russia’s debt-to-GDP ratio should be the envy of much of the G8 during this year’s summit, which Russia is hosting for the first time.
Russia’s economic growth has allowed it to shed its humiliating dependency on foreign credits and humanitarian aid and instead become a participant in aid programs for the world’s poorest nations.
What we are talking about is external independence, which has to be differentiated from internal independence. The latter depends on the internal strength and resilience of the state, society and public institutions. In a democratic state, the people are sovereign, and realize their independence through democratic institutions.
The paradox of Putin’s Russia is that, while the external position of the country is stronger, internal development is taking an increasingly dangerous form. With the strengthening of external independence, the people’s independence is weakening. From a young democratic state in the making, Russia has transformed into a bureaucratic monopoly.
The last five years have seen many restrictive changes: citizens have lost the right to elect regional governors; the election of individual candidates from districts has been jettisoned; and the parliament has been subjugated to the president. The national television channels all support the powers that be. Thousands of candidates – as a rule, those who disagree with government policy – are weeded out of the electoral process. The courts, as seen in the Yukos case, have returned to their Soviet state of dependency on the executive. Recent laws regulating NGOs limit nongovernmental initiatives. The strengthening of Russia’s international position is taking place against the backdrop – and even at the expense of – shrinking democratic liberties and civil rights.
These developments have created three serious threats:
First, the strengthening bureaucratic monopoly is restructuring Russia’s economy to its own needs. The share of state-owned companies is growing fast, particularly in the natural resource sector, which increases the economy’s dependency on the external market prices for raw materials. The growing share of the economy run not by businessmen, but by corrupt bureaucrats, renders economic growth unstable and prone to major crises.
Second, the state is growing increasingly alienated from the people. Russia is changing from a democratic, federal, multinational state into a traditional multinational empire centered in Moscow and based on an imperial bureaucracy. A deficit of democratic legitimacy and the omnipresent corruption fostered by petrodollars only aggravate the problem. Mass protests and the spread of armed conflicts in the Caucasus are adding to the deep crisis of Russian statehood. The erosion of legality, destruction of institutions and disproportionate growth of bureaucratic power are making the political situation increasingly unpredictable, despite the officially proclaimed stability. Similar regimes in Latin America have demonstrated how quickly such “stability” crumbles.
The third threat is in the field of foreign policy. The wager on hydrocarbon exports, the growing appetite of the military and revival of imperial illusions among the political elite are increasing the government’s readiness to gamble externally. Elements of this policy can be seen in the support for authoritarian, even dictatorial regimes along Russia’s borders, attempts at energy blackmail and uncertain positions on some highly dangerous territorial issues.
It sounds a lot like the late Soviet period. From the outside, it looked like a great power controlling half the globe. On the inside, it suffered from a combination of diseases that proved fatal. In the long run, external independence cannot be achieved if it is not backed by internal strength: a strong civil society, efficient institutions, public oversight of the government, and political and economic competition. Until this kind of popular sovereignty is secured, the external “greatness” and “independence” will remain nothing more than a typically Russian Potemkin village.
Vladimir Ryzhkov is an independent deputy in the State Duma. He contributed this comment to Russia Profile.
Or At Least That’s How It Looks From the Outside
It’s clear that Vladimir Putin’s presidency has strengthened Russia’s independence in the international sphere. Gross domestic product has grown by 40 percent, meaning that the country has become stronger. External debt has been reduced from $190 billion to $100 billion, and talk is that the Paris Club debt will be paid off in full this year. Russia’s debt-to-GDP ratio should be the envy of much of the G8 during this year’s summit, which Russia is hosting for the first time.
Russia’s economic growth has allowed it to shed its humiliating dependency on foreign credits and humanitarian aid and instead become a participant in aid programs for the world’s poorest nations.
What we are talking about is external independence, which has to be differentiated from internal independence. The latter depends on the internal strength and resilience of the state, society and public institutions. In a democratic state, the people are sovereign, and realize their independence through democratic institutions.
The paradox of Putin’s Russia is that, while the external position of the country is stronger, internal development is taking an increasingly dangerous form. With the strengthening of external independence, the people’s independence is weakening. From a young democratic state in the making, Russia has transformed into a bureaucratic monopoly.
The last five years have seen many restrictive changes: citizens have lost the right to elect regional governors; the election of individual candidates from districts has been jettisoned; and the parliament has been subjugated to the president. The national television channels all support the powers that be. Thousands of candidates – as a rule, those who disagree with government policy – are weeded out of the electoral process. The courts, as seen in the Yukos case, have returned to their Soviet state of dependency on the executive. Recent laws regulating NGOs limit nongovernmental initiatives. The strengthening of Russia’s international position is taking place against the backdrop – and even at the expense of – shrinking democratic liberties and civil rights.
These developments have created three serious threats:
First, the strengthening bureaucratic monopoly is restructuring Russia’s economy to its own needs. The share of state-owned companies is growing fast, particularly in the natural resource sector, which increases the economy’s dependency on the external market prices for raw materials. The growing share of the economy run not by businessmen, but by corrupt bureaucrats, renders economic growth unstable and prone to major crises.
Second, the state is growing increasingly alienated from the people. Russia is changing from a democratic, federal, multinational state into a traditional multinational empire centered in Moscow and based on an imperial bureaucracy. A deficit of democratic legitimacy and the omnipresent corruption fostered by petrodollars only aggravate the problem. Mass protests and the spread of armed conflicts in the Caucasus are adding to the deep crisis of Russian statehood. The erosion of legality, destruction of institutions and disproportionate growth of bureaucratic power are making the political situation increasingly unpredictable, despite the officially proclaimed stability. Similar regimes in Latin America have demonstrated how quickly such “stability” crumbles.
The third threat is in the field of foreign policy. The wager on hydrocarbon exports, the growing appetite of the military and revival of imperial illusions among the political elite are increasing the government’s readiness to gamble externally. Elements of this policy can be seen in the support for authoritarian, even dictatorial regimes along Russia’s borders, attempts at energy blackmail and uncertain positions on some highly dangerous territorial issues.
It sounds a lot like the late Soviet period. From the outside, it looked like a great power controlling half the globe. On the inside, it suffered from a combination of diseases that proved fatal. In the long run, external independence cannot be achieved if it is not backed by internal strength: a strong civil society, efficient institutions, public oversight of the government, and political and economic competition. Until this kind of popular sovereignty is secured, the external “greatness” and “independence” will remain nothing more than a typically Russian Potemkin village.
Vladimir Ryzhkov is an independent deputy in the State Duma. He contributed this comment to Russia Profile.
# posted by Deval : 5:17 AM
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