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Apr. 21, 2008 - Kommersant by Gleb Cherkassov - Vladimir Putin is finishing the formation of a new political system, which won’t allow Dmitry Medvedev, his successor, to even attempt to act on his own. The incumbent President’s consent to become the leader of United Russia has been a key element in creating the new system. Vladimir Putin’s decision to become the leader of the United Russia Party starting with May 7 must have been the first serious political step of the second President of Russia which was announced in advance. It’s noteworthy that the members of United Russia and officials within the Kremlin Administration as well as the general public learned that Putin would head the party during the parliamentary elections as the decision was announced from the tribune at the United Russia pre-election congress. Spring, 2008 it is less important for Vladimir Putin to overwhelm people with extraordinary deeds than once again assert that everything goes according to his plan and it’s he who keeps a grip on power, not Dmitry Medvedev. As Putin moved into the Kremlin December, 1999, he didn’t have more political power than Dmitry Medvedev, elected President March, 2008. Eight years ago as well as at present the head of state assuming his office was far from being the most influential politician in the country, unable to boast anything except for a high approval rating. By the beginning of 2000 a group of state officials and financiers (known as Semya – the Family) led by the Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Alexander Voloshin had shaped the policy of Russia. Not only was Vladimir Putin to appoint Voloshin the Head of his Administration, he also had to take account of his opinion when taking almost all critical decisions. Besides Vladimir Putin had to keep in his team such politicians as Russian Railways Minister Nikolay Aksenenko, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and EMERCOM (Ministry for the Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Disaster Relief) Minister Sergey Shoygu, who Semya considered possible successors to Boris Yeltsin. As successor to Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin had at least to seem committed to the political line of the First Russian President. 2008 Russia’s policy is determined by a group of managers and CEOs of state corporations headed by Vladimir Putin. Dmitry Medvedev will have to appoint him Prime Minister and take account of his opinion when arriving at all critical decisions. During his work visits, Dmitry Medvedev will have to regularly meet with those who could have become the United Russia presidential nominee. After all, the new president will have to base his policy on the 2020 Strategy, or Putin’s plan. The only difference between Vladimir Putin 2000 and Dmitry Medvedev 2008 lies in the fact that from the very outset, the former had the opportunity to make seemingly marginal appointments. At first they gave way to a series of jokes about “those from St.-Petersburg,” and as time went by, those people formed the mainstay of the notorious vertical of power. Short after appointed Prime Minister August, 1999, Vladimir Putin managed to make Dmitry Kozak the Chief of Staff with the White House, and Dmitry Medvedev – his deputy, Igor Sechin being in charge of the Secretariat of the Prime Minister. Before moving into the Kremlin November 15, 1999 Vladimir Putin succeeded in appointing his associate Sergey Ivanov Secretary of the Security Council. December 31, the day when Boris Yeltsin stepped down, Dmitry Medvedev became the First Deputy to Alexander Voloshin. Igor Sechin moved into the Kremlin, with the general public barely giving attention to the fact. January 5, 2000 a decree was issued to appoint Victor Ivanov Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. Russia’s Finance Minister Alexey Kudrin and future Minister of Economics and Trade German Gref, whom Putin knew well (they had worked together in the administration of St.-Petersburg), were to stay in the government. The Unity faction within the State Duma was headed by another Putin’s “compatriot” Boris Gryzlov. Then other appointments followed, making the incumbent president a bit stronger, and Semya – a bit weaker. In the middle of Vladimir Putin’s first term Alexander Voloshin was surprised to find that he was not the “all-mighty” master of the Presidential Administration anymore, and similarly, Mikhail Kasyanov understood that certain ministers dared defy him. But it was too late to change anything. This said, as soon as promoted, Vladimir Putin moulded and led a team, which enabled him to become the absolute master of the Kremlin. Among others, Dmitry Medvedev participated in the process, with his role being one of the leading. You can recall, for instance, that it was Dmitry Medvedev who succeeded to Alexander Voloshin as Head of the Administration and urged the resignation of Mikhail Kasyanov. Since the events listed have happened recently, the participants remember them pretty well. That is why, when preparing to move from the Administration to the government, Vladimir Putin did his best to arrange it so that his successor couldn’t be seduced into applying the old scheme of grabbing power he knew from the inside. Operation “Successor” cost too much the state machine and Vladimir Putin in particular to let the key object behave inappropriately and spoil everything. The incumbent president is not going to repeat the mistakes of Semya, whose leaders believed that the new head of state could be entrusted as much political power as he could handle. Now the experienced President Putin ascertains that Dmitry Medvedev doesn’t get more power than apportioned to him. Three factors must match for an appointment to be made: There is to be a competitor, a vacancy and political will. Assuming that Dmitry Medvedev is very ambitious and has benchwarmers (at least you can hardly prove the opposite), the matter to be addressed is finding the posts for the people. Vladimir Putin wants to fortify this very front. By the time Dmitry Medvedev will have assumed office, all major posts must be occupied by those promoted by the incumbent president, whom they owe their careers. It’s vital that the appointments be negotiated and made at the time when both incumbent and elected presidents are in the arena together moulding the structure of executive bodies. Consequently, every attempt of Dmitry Medvedev to appoint someone must be preceded by an attempt to fire someone, which can be regarded the incumbent president’s acknowledgement of being mistaken and a straightforward way towards a clash Dmitry Medvedev isn’t ready for. He lacks the power for staff maneuvers. If the post of Prime Minister were a mere formality, all appointments in the White House could be made overriding the Premier’s will. Apparently, Vladimir Putin is not the man to allow this. He wants to be a truly influential Prime Minister, not just play a supporting role. He is willing to select teammates and take charge of them. At that, a major government reshuffle is unlikely to be carried out within a year; even if any of the ministers makes a grave mistake, he/she will first render an account to Vladimir Putin, and then to Dmitry Medvedev, perhaps. Security officials are accountable to Vladimir Putin too. It need be noted that he has been keeping the post of the Security Council Secretary free for some nine months, the position enabling to be in control of the security block in the government. Of course one can’t rule out the possibility of Dmitry Medvedev to promote his adherent to this post, but Vladimir Putin has always regarded the appointments in this field his prerogative. Dmitry Medvedev will have no opportunity to influence the government via the parliament. The chairpersons of both chambers had been elected before he was nominated, and they always act in accordance with the line of Vladimir Putin. Dmitry Medvedev can have some freedom when determining the structure of the Presidential Administration. In theory, the opportunities in this sphere can make up for all other limitations (during eight previous years you must have gotten used to the Kremlin surpassing all other institutions in terms of political power). But this was be possible only in those cases when the head of state (or the Head of the Administration) was an unqualified political leader, whose position couldn’t be challenged. The might of the Administration is based on vague unofficial traditions, rather than constitutional powers. Under Vladimir Putin’s truly influential government and the Putin-oriented parliament the ability of the Administration to impact the line of the government will turn out limited. More to the point, Dmitry Medvedev is likely to have to negotiate his appointments with Vladimir Putin. At the same time, the former president will hardly hinder Dmitry Medvedev in his attempts to establish new councils under his administration or change the composition of those existing: Their role is mainly symbolic. The President will retain control over the State Council, a seemingly powerful institution rarely referred to in practice. Dmitry Medvedev has been entrusted to head its sessions already. The matter of appointing representatives of the government within those companies the state has interest in, is usually addressed in the government. This rule will remain unchanged, and the unofficial tradition of negotiating the appointments in the Administration will be abandoned to some extent. So the Prime Minister will determine who will represent the state within Gazprom and the First Channel. Vladimir Putin’s decision to become the leader of United Russia is another measure taken, so that Dmitry Medvedev couldn’t be seduced into accumulating too much power. Becoming the leader of United Russia, Vladimir Putin became de jure and de facto leader of the state’s administrative and economic bureaucracy. Currently, United Russia appears to be an institution of state management, rather than merely an electoral machine, thanks to the bureaucrats underpinning it as well as the institutions it trampled. United Russia has repeatedly asked Vladimir Putin to become its member, but he decided to head it only after it became too strong, and it was getting dangerous to leave it without control. Even so, it was more important to overhaul the tradition, according to which United Russia modeled its line on that of the Administration. The amendments adopted at the party congress extend the powers of the Chairman of the party. Vladimir Putin will be able to suspend work of any agency of the party and the commissions of any activist. In reality it can mean that any manifestation of disloyalty or carelessness will be nipped in the bud. Account taken of the character of the party Vladimir Putin is going to preside over, one can presume that it can be just hinted at the possibility of using sticks to sap any opposition within the party. Obviously, Dmitry Medvedev and those in his Administration will have opportunities to co-operate with United Russia and some of its activists. But this must be approved by Vladimir Putin or his deputy in the party. Dmitry Medvedev shouldn’t fear that United Russia will impede him, and at the same time he can rely on it only if his interests don’t contradict those of Vladimir Putin. It is fair in a way: since 1999 Vladimir Putin has so much contributed to the development of the party that he can now enjoy the ability to use it the way he needs. If Dmitry Medvedev turns out equally useful for the party, he may succeed in incorporating United Russia into his vertical of power. If he there is a necessity, of course.