Thursday, May 29, 2008
Russia to sue Swiss Noga for $1.6 mln over French asset seizure
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Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Serious division of the Arctic begins
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Is Putin Now Stronger Than Medvedev?
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Putin transferred some of his presidential aides to the cabinet, including his powerful deputy Igor Sechin, while leaving some allies on Medvedev’s staff. Some prominent siloviki were removed from their posts, including Sechin’s ally Vladimir Ustinov as justice minister, Viktor Ivanov as presidential assistant, and Nikolay Patrushev as the Federal Security Services (FSB) director.
In order to enhance the role of his new cabinet, Putin brought some of his presidential aides with him: presidential administration head Sergey Sobyanin became a deputy premier and head of the cabinet's staff; presidential aide Igor Shuvalov became first deputy premier for economics; presidential administration deputy head Sechin became deputy premier for industry; and presidential protocol chief Igor Shchegolev became minister of communications and media.
These appointees were mostly Putin choices, and very few people close to Medvedev have been promoted to key government and presidential staff positions – Alexander Konovalov as the new justice minister, and Konstantin Chuichenko, a former Gazprom official, as Chief of the Presidential Auditing Department. The appointment of Igor Shuvalov as first deputy prime minister has also been attributed to Medvedev, who reportedly wanted Shuvalov as his Chief of Staff. However, Shuvalov has been a Putin loyalist, and was chosen by the latter to carry the heaviest load of duties, in order to relieve Putin of small managerial tasks.
Two important aspects stand out in this reshuffle.
One is that continuous constraints are placed on Medvedev in running the country. All important decisions continue to be made by Putin and his men. Putin even reorganized the Cabinet by setting up a narrow governing body – the Presidium--filled with his men, comprising the defense and the foreign ministers. This is a sign that Putin will continue to have a final say on national security issues. Medvedev would not even hold the weekly government meetings Putin used to chair every Monday. Medvedev’s role appears to be evolving; he is in search of a mission, while Putin continues to be where he has always been – in a commanding position of power.
The other important aspect is the nearly full annihilation of the siloviki camp within the Kremlin. Although the new Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Naryshkin is a classmate of Putin from the KGB foreign intelligence school, he is more of an economic administrator than a security man. The removal of Igor Sechin and Victor Ivanov from the Kremlin (the latter became the chief of the Drug Enforcement Service), the retirement of former FSB Chief Nikolai Patrushev to an inconsequential position of the Secretary of the Security Council, as well as the removal of Vladimir Ustinov from the Justice Ministry, have left the siloviki without an operating platform and a leader to coalesce around. Sechin’s elevation to deputy prime minister having no control over the government staff has made him a publicly accountable official with a heavy portfolio. Putin and Medvedev appear to have decisively dealt with the feuding security clans, and signaled that the siloviki would no longer exercise much political influence.
Although the Russian stock market showed increasing confidence in the Putin-Medvedev Dream Team, growing by almost ten percent in one week, a few serious questions remain. How will the key decisions be made in the country? Why does Medvedev continue to exercise so little freedom of movement, while the spotlight remains on Putin, who seems to be relishing the role of the super powerful prime minister? Would the current constraints on Medvedev gradually be lifted, allowing him to take control of policy making, or would the current strange arrangement continue till the next presidential election in 2012? Would Medvedev bolt from the arrangement that makes him look like a figurehead president? Will the present power sharing arrangement between Putin and Medvedev help ensure stability and economic growth, or would it prove destabilizing and crippling for the country’s ability to make difficult decisions? How will the demotion of the siloviki affect both economic and foreign policy in Russia? What is the idea behind creating a separate Federal Agency for the CIS Affairs? Is Russia signaling that it no longer considers the CIS affairs “foreign”?
Russia Went to Law against Noga
May 27, 2008 - Kommersant - Russia’s government has filed a suit to a French court against Swiss Noga, seeking the compensation of material damage caused by illegal seizure of the RF assets in France, the RF Finance Ministry announced via the press release. Noga is expected to compensate for the damage caused to the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and RIA Novosti news agency. Although the company was unable to seize the government’s assets, its actions were to the detriment of Russia’s reputation and economic interests, the ministry’s statement says without specifying the claimed amount. France froze the assets of CBR and RIA Novosti in January 2008 by demand of Noga, which alleged that those institutions were divisions of the RF government and therefore, its debtors. Russia currently owes 49 million euro to Noga. CBR and RIA Novosti contested that decision of French leadership in March, Russia promised to file a counterclaim against Noga in April, and the assets were finally released in May. Swiss Noga clinched deals for supplying goods to Russia in early 1990s. The contract was cancelled under the government’s demand and the company failed to prove the exact worth of the goods shipped to the country. The U.S. businessman Alexander Kogan bought out the government’s debt in 2006 and transferred it to the government afterwards. Russia owes nothing to Noga, he reiterated.
Monday, May 19, 2008
New U.S. Ambassador with a Past
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Thursday, May 08, 2008
Dmitry Medvedev: Gazprom Chairman Of Board Of Directors Became Russian
President
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Putin's gov't to foster Russian companies' investments abroad
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U.S. promises cannot be trusted - Gorbachev
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Wednesday, May 07, 2008
President Medvedev's economic challenges
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Inflation Russia seems to have been developing quite well despite this chronic problem. However, the growth of prices accelerated last year and reached nearly 12% compared with 9% in 2006 and the planned 8.5% in 2007. The Russian government and Central Bank hope to stop inflation at 10% in 2008, although it has already reached 6.3% in the first four months. Experts predict yearend inflation at between 12% and 18%, which will discourage investment. Vladimir Putin pointed to a decrease in the fund for reforming the housing and utilities sector because of growing inflation, but the problem is much more serious. Investments are difficult to plan and make when prices keep rising. The outgoing government failed to draft a comprehensive anti-inflation program, but on May 6, its last day, it approved a schedule for a rapid growth of natural monopolies' tariffs until 2011, which will further stimulate inflation.
Commodities dependence Oil prices have soared to $120 per barrel and are unlikely to fall very low, even though economic growth in the United States and Europe has slowed down, reducing the demand for energy. Under a pessimistic scenario, the stagnation of the U.S. economy would last two years and spread to Europe, bringing oil prices down. However, the Russian government's economic advisers point to long-term macroeconomic stability in Russia, referring mainly to "safety bags" created mostly with export revenues, notably the Central Bank's international reserves and the reserve and national welfare funds. But if oil prices plummet, although this is highly unlikely, these safety bags will suffice only for a year or two. After that, the ruble will start losing weight, along with people's real incomes. Worse still, Russia's manufacturing sector will lose contracts because investment programs will be curtailed due to a fall in export revenues. In this event, the Russian economy will first overheat and then its growth will almost come to a standstill.
Banking crisis Unlike the hypothetical decline in oil prices, the likelihood of a banking crisis is growing quickly because Russia is linked to the global economy not only through commodities prices, but also through capital flows. In the past few fat years, Russian banks have taken out a huge amount of relatively cheap loans in the West. But the banking crisis currently underway there and subsequent increase in commercial interest on loans have greatly complicated Russian banks' ability to refinance debts. They are now denied loans abroad, or offered them at a high interest. Short-term loans are refinanced by the Central Bank's financial injections, but long-term refinancing will already become a serious problem this year. The Central Bank is helping banks by injecting money into the market, but it is also complicating their life by increasing its refinance rate. The Russian banking community has already proposed using the National Welfare Fund, even if partially, to solve the long-term refinancing problem.
Demographic problem The shortage of workforce is becoming a huge problem in Russia. Industries lack qualified personnel, and the number of agricultural workers is plummeting because people are moving to the cities. At the same time, prices of agricultural products have been growing rapidly, spurring inflation in 2007 and 2008. Russia can no longer offer cheap labor, which had been its advantage over industrialized countries, because people's incomes are growing. Therefore, a key task for the government is to train personnel and attract skilled labor migrants.
Modernization There is a remedy for the chronic disease of the Russian economy and a way to reply to global challenges. The country must invest petrodollars in new technologies and transportation infrastructure to ease its dependence on raw materials and stop the fear of a fall in oil prices. With high technologies and reliable infrastructure, Russia will be able to maintain high GDP growth rates even despite a relatively small, compared with Asian countries, but skilled and economically active population. Workers in high-tech sectors will receive high wages, but gains will be also immense because of high labor productivity. The successful development of high-tech sectors is impossible without increasing competition. Therefore, the government and state officials must give up their excessive economic functions and powers. Competition is the main anti-inflation tool in a market economy. Russia has created the initial conditions for attaining these goals. It has set up development institutions, such as the Russian Venture Company and the Bank for Development, and has been working for over a year on a concept of socio-economic development until 2020, which provides for innovation-driven progress. However, the development institutions are not yet working to capacity, and the outgoing government has not presented the final wording for the Concept 2020. Dmitry Medvedev's economic policy spotlights four I's - institutions, infrastructure, innovation and investment. This gives hope that the new president will see the challenges facing Russia better than the outgoing administration and government.
Tuesday, May 06, 2008
Putin signs bill on foreign capital's access to strategic assets
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Written interview with Gerhard Schroeder
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Question: You are on good terms with Vladimir Putin. But what about Dmitry Medvedev? You must know him well - he was one of the heads of Gazprom. Answer: I've known Medvedev for many years, and respect him as a man open and ready for discussion and guided by firm principles. As first deputy prime minister, he has shown that he is not only competent in economic and social policies, but is strong enough to implement his decisions. He has stated that consolidating a law-based state is one of his priorities. I'm sure that he will achieve this goal. There is no doubt that he has amassed enough experience in the world arena during his numerous meetings abroad. He will continue following the path that Russia chose as a stable and reliable partner in international politics and as a G8 member. There are complicated international tasks which can only be resolved by cooperating with Russia, such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, settling conflicts in the Middle East, and climate change. I'm convinced that Russia will make a substantial contribution to the resolution of these problems under Medvedev's leadership.
Q: The West believes that Medvedev will be a more liberal president than Vladimir Putin. What do you think on this score? A: I don't see any political differences between Putin and Medvedev. Up until now they have jointly determined Russia's policies. The West often misinterprets Putin's policies and convictions. There is no doubt that Russia has become a more open, democratic, stable and successful state than it was before Putin became president. By and large, the new president will continue Putin's policy, as he has declared. This is the correct decision. In the last few years, Russia has been a stable factor, unlike the rest of the world. I'm sure that under Medvedev, Russia will remain stable.
Q: On the eve of the recent NATO summit in Bucharest, Germany, France and some other European countries were against Ukraine and Georgia immediately joining the NATO Membership Action Plan. Nevertheless, NATO said that its doors are open to everyone and promised to resume a discussion of this issue at the end of this year. What chance do Ukraine and Georgia have of joining NATO? Will Germany side with its NATO allies on this issue, or will it consider the position of Russia, which is resolutely against NATO's advance toward its borders? A: Many nations, including some NATO countries, are skeptical about Ukraine and Georgia's entry into NATO. I'm skeptical, too. Most people in Ukraine are against joining NATO. The domestic political situation in Georgia is uncertain; moreover, it has outstanding conflicts, which cannot be taken into NATO by any means. I'd advise refraining from any action that may be interpreted as encircling or deterring Russia. NATO membership for these countries would be such a step.
Q: Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence has not yet received broad international support. Moreover, some countries, including Russia and a number of EU members, insist that the actions of the Kosovo authorities violate international law and UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Moscow believes that those who have strongly supported Kosovo's independence have failed to explain why its situation is unique. Do you believe that it is unique? Do you think it may trigger off a chain reaction in other regions with "frozen conflicts"? A: Indeed, having recognized Kosovo's independence, the majority of EU members and the United States have created many problems. I mean not only Kosovo but also the conflicts that you have mentioned. In my opinion, this step was wrong because it was premature. There were other options. I think that Serbia should be admitted to the EU, if it wants. Kosovo could join the EU as part of Serbia, or it could acquire independent statehood when Serbia becomes a member. In any event, this conflict cannot be resolved without the participation of pro-European forces from President Boris Tadic's team. However, Kosovo's recognition has weakened these forces, probably so much that we will soon have to deal with an isolated and unpredictable Kosovo. To be honest, it is a pity that the EU has followed the United States' lead on this issue. This decision was probably in America's favor, but it was not at all in Europe's interests.
Q: Some of Germany's neighbors are accusing it of being friends with Russia ‘over their heads' with regard to Nord Stream. Is Nord Stream really that dangerous for Poland, the Baltic nations and Sweden? They are going to all-out to impede its construction. Will it be put into operation as planned - the first line in 2011 and the second in 2012? A: Nord Stream is not directed against anyone. To the contrary, it will make a major contribution to Europe's reliable supply of natural gas. This is a Russian-European rather than a Russian-German project. This is why the European Union views Nord Stream as a project which is of interest to all of Europe. And this is why all EU members should support it. Needless to say, the gas pipeline's construction and operation will comply with all environmental and technical standards. We believe that accelerated construction and intensive dialogue with other countries will allow us to start gas supplies in 2011.
Q: What about the attitude of other countries toward Nord Stream's sea route? When will they finally agree to it? A: Responding to their wishes, we are currently studying alternative routes for Nord Stream. In order to avoid delays, we are trying to streamline construction and allocate enough time to getting the approval of other countries. We will harmonize our subsequent actions with all Baltic states during international consultations. This process will take several months. Concrete deadlines will depend on how constructive the efforts of all countries are.
Q: Why has the project become more expensive - 7.4 billion euros according to Gazprom's estimate? Its price tag was previously about 6 billion euros. A: The previous estimate was too rough; it was made more than two years ago, when the project had just been launched. Now a number of important factors have been taken into account during its planning. A considerable part of the increase is explained by safety regulations and environmental considerations. The dynamics of world prices have also exerted considerable influence on Nord Stream's costs, as well as on all its relevant infrastructure projects.
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