Zee Beam News

May 23, 2008 - Russia Profile - by Vladimir Frolov - The new government and the Kremlin lineup that were announced last week appear to have strengthened the role of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and demonstrated President Dmitry Medvedev’s constraints in personnel policy, while diminishing the influence of some of the security services hardliners who opposed Medvedev’s elevation as Putin’s successor.
Putin transferred some of his presidential aides to the cabinet, including his powerful deputy Igor Sechin, while leaving some allies on Medvedev’s staff. Some prominent siloviki were removed from their posts, including Sechin’s ally Vladimir Ustinov as justice minister, Viktor Ivanov as presidential assistant, and Nikolay Patrushev as the Federal Security Services (FSB) director.
In order to enhance the role of his new cabinet, Putin brought some of his presidential aides with him: presidential administration head Sergey Sobyanin became a deputy premier and head of the cabinet's staff; presidential aide Igor Shuvalov became first deputy premier for economics; presidential administration deputy head Sechin became deputy premier for industry; and presidential protocol chief Igor Shchegolev became minister of communications and media.
These appointees were mostly Putin choices, and very few people close to Medvedev have been promoted to key government and presidential staff positions – Alexander Konovalov as the new justice minister, and Konstantin Chuichenko, a former Gazprom official, as Chief of the Presidential Auditing Department. The appointment of Igor Shuvalov as first deputy prime minister has also been attributed to Medvedev, who reportedly wanted Shuvalov as his Chief of Staff. However, Shuvalov has been a Putin loyalist, and was chosen by the latter to carry the heaviest load of duties, in order to relieve Putin of small managerial tasks.
Two important aspects stand out in this reshuffle.
One is that continuous constraints are placed on Medvedev in running the country. All important decisions continue to be made by Putin and his men. Putin even reorganized the Cabinet by setting up a narrow governing body – the Presidium--filled with his men, comprising the defense and the foreign ministers. This is a sign that Putin will continue to have a final say on national security issues. Medvedev would not even hold the weekly government meetings Putin used to chair every Monday. Medvedev’s role appears to be evolving; he is in search of a mission, while Putin continues to be where he has always been – in a commanding position of power.
The other important aspect is the nearly full annihilation of the siloviki camp within the Kremlin. Although the new Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Naryshkin is a classmate of Putin from the KGB foreign intelligence school, he is more of an economic administrator than a security man. The removal of Igor Sechin and Victor Ivanov from the Kremlin (the latter became the chief of the Drug Enforcement Service), the retirement of former FSB Chief Nikolai Patrushev to an inconsequential position of the Secretary of the Security Council, as well as the removal of Vladimir Ustinov from the Justice Ministry, have left the siloviki without an operating platform and a leader to coalesce around. Sechin’s elevation to deputy prime minister having no control over the government staff has made him a publicly accountable official with a heavy portfolio. Putin and Medvedev appear to have decisively dealt with the feuding security clans, and signaled that the siloviki would no longer exercise much political influence.
Although the Russian stock market showed increasing confidence in the Putin-Medvedev Dream Team, growing by almost ten percent in one week, a few serious questions remain. How will the key decisions be made in the country? Why does Medvedev continue to exercise so little freedom of movement, while the spotlight remains on Putin, who seems to be relishing the role of the super powerful prime minister? Would the current constraints on Medvedev gradually be lifted, allowing him to take control of policy making, or would the current strange arrangement continue till the next presidential election in 2012? Would Medvedev bolt from the arrangement that makes him look like a figurehead president? Will the present power sharing arrangement between Putin and Medvedev help ensure stability and economic growth, or would it prove destabilizing and crippling for the country’s ability to make difficult decisions? How will the demotion of the siloviki affect both economic and foreign policy in Russia? What is the idea behind creating a separate Federal Agency for the CIS Affairs? Is Russia signaling that it no longer considers the CIS affairs “foreign”?